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Abstract 
 
Large-scale floods have the potential to generate substantial economic losses. Within 
Europe, governments have dealt with these losses in different ways, which may or 
may not have enhanced adaptability of their societies. In this research we develop a 
classification of insurance and compensation systems to deal with losses from floods. 
We suggest that, from the perspective of adaptive capacity to uncertain future risks, 
commercial flood insurance is to be preferred on the basis of the assumption that 
commercial insurance premiums are better capable of transferring price signals of 
actual flood risks. Such systems can therefore give stronger incentives for risk 
reduction. Next, we describe the actual insurance and compensation systems for 
dealing with flood losses that have been set up in 19 European countries. Our findings 
are that the availability of commercial flood insurance is widespread in Europe. 
However, actual market penetration can be called high (50% or more) in only 7 
countries. To get an indication of the dynamic behind this, we statistically assess 
whether or not the choice of flood risk management system and factors such as market 
penetration are related to flood risks and socio-economic aspects, such as population 
size and GDP. This analysis indicates that country surface area and population size 
seem to be the dominant factors for determining the type of flood insurance system, 
and therefore possibilities may exist in some European countries to increase the share 
of commercial flood insurance. In some countries flood hazards and flood risks may 
be too high for the private sector to provide full cover. This implies also that there is a 
continued role for governments in helping to increase the market penetration of 
private flood insurance, as well as for loss prevention programmes. Further 
harmonisation of insurance regulation in Europe could increase the possibilities for 
private insurance companies to take on risks. 
 
Keywords: climate change, Europe, flood, governance, insurance, risk 
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Introduction 
 
Large-scale floods can generate substantial impacts. Global direct economic losses 
from so-called great floods have increased from approximately 32 billion during the 
period 1950-1959, to 245 billion US dollars during the period 1995-2004 (Kron, 
2005). Catastrophic natural disasters have the potential to reduce the number of 
insurance firms that underwrite coverage and reduce the amount of premiums 
collected, as shown for instance for the USA (Born and Viscusi, 2006). For the most 
part, the increases in losses from weather related disasters have been caused by 
increased exposure, as growing numbers of people and amounts of capital are located 
in areas that are at risk from natural hazards (e.g. Changnon, 2003). Some have 
argued that global warming and subsequent increases in the frequency and/or severity 
of extreme weather events may have played a role as well (e.g. Mills, 2005; Höppe 
and Pielke, 2006). 
 
Some weather related risks, such as storm and hail risks are usually well covered in 
most developed countries through voluntary insurance. The market penetration of 
storm insurance is above 75% in 14 out of 18 European countries (CEA, 2005). 
However, a number of factors make that commercial insurance of flood risk based on 
individual and voluntary policies remains difficult (Munich Re, 1997; Swiss Re 
1998a): 
• Since floods in coastal and river floods can lead to an enormous accumulation of 
losses, if they affect a low-lying area with substantial amounts of assets, leading to 
correlated risks of the different insurance policies. 
• Flood risks are not uniformly distributed over space in regions or countries, as 
they tend to occur in particular confined locations. Therefore only a certain part of 
the population is at (greatest) risk and may want to buy insurance, which is called 
adverse selection. Adverse selection is a problem for insurance companies if they 
have difficulty in screening customers (information asymmetry) and/or if they are 
not allowed to charge risk-based premiums. Adverse selection would make the 
system economically unsustainable, as a substantive population is required to 
carry the burden of the premiums needed to cover the losses. For policymakers, 
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adverse selection leads to a potential collective action problem, as only part of the 
population would support efforts to reduce or transfer risks. 
• In order to set a premium that adequately reflects the cost of risk, insurers need to 
be able to determine to a particular degree the expected losses and their return 
period. Flood risks are relatively difficult to assess, as for many countries there are 
no long records of historic losses available, also because large flood, such as 
storm surges, are relatively rare. The numerical modelling of floods is to some 
extent a solution, as it may provide insight in the possible size of loss events. Also 
loss events with low return periods can be simulated in this way. However, the 
accurate assessment of return periods and potential losses from floods can be 
much more difficult for situations that are hydrologically more complex, such as 
in The Netherlands, (see Floris, 2005; Van der Most and Wehrung, 2005). 
 
Within Europe, governments have developed different ways in which to deal with 
losses from flood risks (e.g. Van Schoubroeck, 1997). In most countries, the 
government has a role in securing coverage of flood losses. This is often achieved 
through insurance regulation, for instance through the prescription of compulsory 
natural hazards cover, that is sold together with commercial fire contracts. 
Alternatively, the government may set up a system similar to traditional insurance in 
the sense that funds are collected ex ante (before the event), either through premiums, 
or taxes on insurance premiums. Finally, governments may provide loss compensation 
from tax money, either ad hoc or through budget reservations, borrowing or running 
budget deficits. 
 
In the future, there may be an increase in loss potentials due to ongoing economic 
development and increasing vulnerabilities. Additionally, probabilities of extreme 
weather events could increase due to future climate change, which may reduce the 
availability and affordability of insurance (Mills, 2005). In this light, current practices 
with regard to compensation and insurance of losses due to flooding may need to be 
reconsidered. Within the literature on adaptation to climate change, insurance is often 
mentioned as an important tool to transfer risks and create incentives for risk 
reduction (e.g. Dlugolecki, 2000; Vellinga et al., 2001; ABI, 2005; Bouwer and 
Vellinga, 2005; Bouwer and Aerts, 2006; UNEP-FI, 2006). The climate policy arena 
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has also identified insurance as a means to accommodate increasing risks due to 
climate change, as can be read in a recent report on technologies for adaptation to 
climate change by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC, 2006). However, only few have addressed how exactly insurance would 
contribute to adaptation. 
 
Within water resources management, thinking on so-called adaptive management also 
puts emphasis on the development of non-structural measures that may reduce risks, 
such as tools related to finances and risk. Typical characteristics of adaptive regimes 
would in this respect include “financial resources diversified using a broad set of 
private and public financial instruments” (Pahl-Wostl, 2007: table 1). 
 
Within this latter context the question can be asked what particular aspects of flood 
risks management contribute to an adaptive approach towards increasing natural 
hazard risks. Increasing natural hazard risks in turn lead to the question what 
adjustments in flood insurance systems are exactly needed and which adjustments can 
be made in order to be able to sustain current insurance systems. Adjustments could 
consist of risk reduction, improved loss sharing between public and private sector to 
increase insurability (e.g. Swiss Re, 2002), or reform of insurance sector regulation 
(e.g. Huber, 2004). Flood insurance systems may thus contribute to adaptive 
management of flood risks. However, the different insurance systems in operation 
now may need to be adjusted as well in view of changing risks. These are the two 
main issues we want to address, through an overview of flood insurance systems in 
Europe and their properties. 
 
The goal of our research is to assess government compensation systems and 
commercial insurance arrangements for dealing with flood losses in a number of 
European countries on the basis of existing literature. Flood losses in this research 
cover property losses to buildings and their content, rather than loss of life or business 
interruption. Our aim is not to provide an in depth and detailed review of each 
national system, as this is already done by a number of original sources from which 
we report. Instead we provide a cross-country overview of broad characteristics and 
differences that may serve as an illustration of the applicability of different insurance 
systems. Our research involves an explorative exercise, which tries to generate some 
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general conclusions on the functioning of flood insurance systems and their 
contribution to adaptive management. Our aim is to divide different systems in 
Europe into categories, and describe some general characteristics for each of these 
categories. 
 
The following section provides an introduction into the relationships between 
insurance, flood risk management and the role of government and private sector, as 
well as aspects that may contribute to adaptive management. Next, we present the 
methods and datasets that are used for the comparative research. In the two final 
sections, the results are presented and discussed, and some conclusions are drawn. 
 
 
Flood insurance and compensation systems and adaptive management 
 
Flood insurance and compensation systems are important parts of strategies for 
dealing with flood risks. In order to assess possibilities for further adjustments in 
insurance and compensation systems it may be useful to gather information on the 
properties of the various flood insurance systems and especially on the roles of 
governments and private enterprises in flood insurance systems. This focus on the 
roles of governments and private sector is not new (e.g. Epple and Lave, 1988; Nutter 
2002; Green and Penning-Rowsell, 2004), but it appears that most comparative 
studies on properties of insurance systems for natural hazards have provided a rather 
general overview of insurance system functions and coverage (e.g. OECD, 2003; 
Paklina, 2003; CEA 2005), have focused on the legal aspects of flood insurance 
systems (e.g. Van Schoubroeck, 1997), or they have compared insurance systems in 
terms of coverage and market penetration (e.g. Swiss Re, 1998b). There is increasing 
evidence, however, that a combination of natural and institutional aspects explains the 
vulnerability to natural disasters and their impacts (Kahn, 2005; Ahrens and Rudolph, 
2006). The ways in which residual losses are covered through insurance and 
compensation probably also reflect the broader institutional setting. 
 
Government role 
 
7 
Flood risk management consists of the two main aspects of protection against floods 
and response to the consequences of floods, including compensation of any losses that 
may occur (Huber, 2004). Governments have a central role in flood protection, mainly 
by designing and executing flood protection programmes aimed at maintaining public 
safety and suitable environments for economic development (Dahlström et al., 2003). 
As mentioned before, three distinct roles emerge for the government with regard to 
dealing with residual losses: A government may either regulate the private insurance 
sector market, it may set up own systems for primary insurance or reinsurance, or it 
may provide ex ante relief, as an insurer of last resort. Some national governments 
have regarded their liability for flood losses as too large, and are making attempts to 
shift a larger share of the risk to the private market, for instance in Belgium (Van 
Schoubroeck, 2003) and The Netherlands (ACW, 2006). 
 
Several developments are already ongoing in the area of policies for flood risk 
assessment and protection, as well as loss compensation, that may address these issues 
both at the national and European level. For instance, a proposed Flood Water 
Directive1 aims at regulating downstream flood risks, with requirements for EU 
member states to assess and eventually reduce flood risks. The EU Solidarity Fund2 
was installed after the catastrophic flooding in Central Europe in 2002. The fund 
currently has an annual budget of 1 billion Euros, and is intended to supply 
emergency financial aid to member state governments. The fund potentially limits the 
demand for commercial insurance if such reimbursements would, directly or 
indirectly, allow victims to obtain aid without paying a premium. 
 
Commercial insurance 
 
Insurance systems set up by the private sector have the power to transfer risks from 
the local level to national and global insurance markets through primary insurance and 
reinsurance. Additionally, ongoing mergers and consolidation within the financial 
services market would increasingly allow insurance companies to shift risks towards 
the capital market and would reduce the vulnerability of the sector (Vellinga et al., 
                                                 
1
 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/flood_risk/pdf/com_2006_15_en.pdf 
2
 http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/g24217.htm 
8 
2001). However, it has to be noted that primary insurance in Europe is still very much 
a national or even sub-national level activity. This national focus is likely to be 
largely due to the fact that insurance regulation varies considerably between countries. 
 
The application of commercial insurance may also lead to more flexible and adaptive 
management of risks, as the sector is better equipped to estimate potential losses using 
models and historic data and set adequate premiums. Price signals are transferred 
through the setting of premiums to individual citizens about their actual risks, which 
may influence their behaviour and decisions, for instance regarding house 
construction (Kunreuther, 1974). 
 
In government compensation systems, governments may be more inclined to grant 
compensation just before elections, for example shown for the US (Downton and 
Pielke, 2001). The same holds true for European governments, based on either ex ante 
premium or ex post compensation, for instance in Belgium and The Netherlands. 
Within the commercial system the decision to provide compensation is not politicised, 
but bound by insurance contracts. 
 
Some specific efforts of the commercial sector are targeted towards risk reduction. 
These activities may also be beneficial for reducing the impacts from climate change, 
although most efforts in the insurance sector related to climate change appear to be 
aimed at reductions of greenhouse gas emissions (Mills and Lecomte, 2006). 
However, indirect incentives may be given if loss reduction is stimulated through 
insurance premiums that are based on actual risks. 
 
Adaptive management 
 
Adaptive management is an approach to the management of ecosystems that 
anticipates change and addresses uncertainty. To a degree the agenda of adaptive 
management is about adaptation to foreseeable climatic change. At a more 
fundamental level however, adaptive management is about “adaptability”, which 
refers to concepts such as learning, openness, and flexibility of approach. Adaptive 
management is increasingly embraced as a leading paradigm for water management 
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(Pahl-Wostl, 2007; Huitema et al., submitted). This justifies the question how 
insurance and compensation systems relate to adaptation and adaptability. 
 
Ongoing development in at-risk areas and possible changes in extreme weather 
events, may lead to growing risks and therefore an increasing demand for loss 
compensation of some sort, either through commercial insurance or government 
compensation. As mentioned earlier, flood risk management consists of the important 
factors of flood protection and flood loss compensation. Measures for flood protection 
and exposure reduction are closely linked to decisions on land use allocation. Price 
signals trough differentiated commercial insurance that reflect actuarial risks may 
contribute to incentives to reduce exposure. For instance, conditions for cover and 
premium reduction may be applied if individual policyholders manage to reduce risks. 
Additionally, insurance companies may decide that the risk in certain areas is no 
longer insurable. This could lead to pressure on the government to invest in flood risk 
reduction. This situation has been observed in the UK, where insures have announced 
to be no longer prepared to take on risks, if land use planning and flood defences 
would not be improved (Crichton, 2005: 84). 
 
If premiums do not reflect the actual risks, cross subsidies of risks may occur between 
groups at high risk and groups at little or no risk. This is the case for instance in the 
United Kingdom, where market penetration rates are estimated to be as high as 95%, 
whilst the share of people at risk from flooding is only 10% (Huber 2004). Such cross 
subsidisation may be present in any country where fixed rates for flood insurance are 
applied, and where bundling of flood cover with fire insurance is either compulsory or 
commonplace. Cross subsidisation could be acceptable and desirable from a social 
point of view. But potentially increasing risks may lead to higher costs that render the 
system unsustainable. Risk reduction is therefore key to keep insurance systems 
viable. In the UK for instance, it is becoming clear that a lack of investment in flood 
protection on the part of the government has lead to a belief by the insurance sector 
that in certain areas risks may become no longer insurable, and premiums are now 
becoming differentiated in some areas (Huber, 2004). A similar observation can be 
made in The Netherlands, where there are indications that flood risks have increased 
deteriorated over the past 50 years (Ten Brinke and Bannink, 2004), which may 
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reduce the willingness of insurance companies to start covering flood risks. At the 
same time, the government has denied compensation in a number of instances. 
 
Certain aspects would affect the adaptability of insurance and compensation systems. 
Although we do not attempt to prove which aspects would make such systems more 
adaptable, we propose a tentative definition. Future research could test which 
insurance systems are more adaptable, using this definition and using empirical 
indicators. Our suggested understanding of adaptable flood insurance and 
compensation systems consists of the following elements: 
• If the reduction of the aggregate costs of flood protection and loss compensation 
(residual losses) is an important aim of adaptive management, then premiums or 
taxes would need to reflect actuarial risks. This could be best achieved through 
differentiated ex ante premiums, in combination with insurance conditions. Ex 
post compensation, if funded from regular taxes, could never transfer risk prices, 
and would therefore be a less preferable option. Accepting that differentiated 
premiums are necessary implies accepting that this could make risky areas 
unattractive for habitation, and may put parts of society in an undesirable 
situation. 
• Insurance companies are likely to be better placed to calculate actuarial risks, and 
set adequate premiums and insurance conditions such as cover and deductibles, 
and would therefore be well positioned to develop insurance products. Insurance 
companies may also be more inclined to take a long time horizon in mind that 
would allow the valuation of and planning for low probability-high loss events. 
• The diversity within Europe of various national approaches for insurance systems, 
which will be discussed in more depth below, reflects the particular local flood 
risks and the political decisions that have been taken in those countries, also with 
regard to cross subsidies and solidarity. This diversity could be seen as beneficial 
to developing and testing different approaches. However, as we will show later, 
scale is an important issue, as flood risks may be too high in some of the smaller 
European countries. This scale dependence may be prohibitive for developing 
viable insurance systems that transfer risks outside the region. A concerted and 
Europe-wide approach to flood risks would therefore seem more suitable. 
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Methods and data 
 
Insurance systems within European countries can be divided in three classes. We 
compare the insurance systems properties, consisting of the role of the government 
and insurance market penetration, with statistical country properties, such as the 
physical flood hazard and flood risk, national population size and gross domestic 
product (GDP). 
 
Properties of insurance and compensation systems 
 
Information on properties of insurance system was collected from various sources, but 
mainly from published scientific literature and information collected by the insurance 
sector. These sources included the following: 
• Van Schoubroeck (1997), who provides an overview of the legal aspects of 
natural disaster cover in 14 European countries. 
• Swiss Re (1998b), which provides an extensive overview of areas at risk, 
historical loss figures, loss potentials and flood insurance systems in 24 countries, 
including 11 European countries. 
• OECD (2003), which provides a table with characteristics of disaster 
compensation systems for 15 countries, including 8 European countries. 
• CEA (2005), which provides an overview of insurance cover and insurance 
market penetration levels for natural hazards, including flood insurance in 18 
European countries. 
 
The information from these reports was analysed and used to describe the general 
characterisation of flood insurance systems, and determine the extent of cover from 
these systems. 
 
Information on the market penetration index of the different insurance systems 
consists of quantitative and qualitative information. Therefore both the quantitative 
and qualitative were translated into an index. Table 1 shows how the index was based 
on market penetration percentages and penetration qualifications. 
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Table 1. Market penetration index. 
Penetration % Qualification Index 
Negligible  0 
<10%  1 
10-25%  2 
25-50%  3 
50-75% High 4 
75-100% Very high 5 
 
 
Statistical country properties 
 
A series of data for 19 European countries was taken from the European Spatial 
Observation Network (ESPON) dataset, which is available from http://www.espon.eu. 
The advantages of using this data are that the dataset covers all 27 European Union 
countries, as well as Switzerland and Norway, it has a comprehensive set of data on 
population, employment, economic output, the data is comparable across countries as 
it has (mostly) the same source and baseline date, and the dataset has information on 
flood hazards, based on actual observations. 
 
All data was collected at the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) 
3 level, which is a local administrative unit, the geographical size of which varies per 
country3. The variables taken from the ESPON dataset for the present study are listed 
in Table 2. 
 
Information on flood risks is usually available for most European countries at the 
national and basin level. There are at present however no comprehensive flood hazard 
or risk assessments available for the whole of Europe that would allow a cross-
country comparison. Munich Re (1997) for instance relates the global flood hazard to 
the global distribution of the maximum 24-hour precipitation amount, which is only a 
                                                 
3
 For details see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nomenclature_of_Territorial_Units_for_Statistics 
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rough approximation of flood risks. A number of European research projects is now 
working to create flood risk maps, that take into account both the hazard and exposure 
to flooding, such as the Floodsite project (http://www.floodsite.net/) and the Armonia 
project (http://www.armoniaproject.net). 
 
Table 2. ESPON NUTS3 level data. 
Symbol ESPON code Description Unit Period 
H0 FlooN302 Regional flood hazard potential 5 classes 1987-2002 
A Area Surface area km2 2003 
GDP GDPph02N3 Gross domestic product Euro 2002 
P AvgPopN303 Average population Inhabitants 2003 
 
 
The flood hazard index in the ESPON dataset contains actual floods observed during 
the period 1987-2002, based on information from the Global Active Archive of Large 
Flood Events of the Dartmouth Flood Observatory (USA) and additional data 
(Schmidt-Thomé, 2006). The ESPON dataset may currently be the most 
comprehensive one, although it is only based on observed floods for a relatively short 
period, that may include flood events that can have a both relatively high and low 
frequency of occurrence. The dataset therefore does not provide information on 
probabilities attached to the observed events. However, the observed flooding over 
the period 1987-2002 is likely to have influenced the present flood management 
policy in European countries, as well as the policy and legislation related to flood 
insurance and compensation. Therefore this dataset is clearly important for our study. 
 
Calculations 
 
In order to make cross-comparisons of flood hazard characteristics between countries, 
it was necessary to aggregate the information from the NUTS3 level to the national 
level, and to make some adjustments in order to get an area weighted value. 
 
The area-adjusted flood hazard index H  for each country is defined as: 
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where 0H  is the original flood hazard index (see above) and A  is the surface area of 
each individual NUTS3 level area from ESPON (see Table 2). 
 
Usually, flood risk is defined as the total capital that is actually at risk multiplied by 
the probability of flooding. However, we have no accurate information for both for 
each country. In order to get a rough estimate of the capital at risk from flooding in 
each country, we multiplied the total amount of GDP produced in all NUTS3 level 
areas with the flood hazard index H . Total risk R  is therefore defined for a total of 
NUTS3 levels per country as: 
 
 
( )
( )
0H A GDP PR
A
× × ×
=


       (2) 
 
where GDP  is the gross domestic product per inhabitant, and P  is the population 
size in each individual NUTS3 level area. 
 
Population density is simply calculated as the total population size per country 
divided by the total country area. 
 
 
Results 
 
The results of our research are presented as follows: first we present measures of 
actual flood risks in Europe. Second, we provide an overview of the different 
insurance systems, and a brief summary of its characteristics. Thirdly, a number of 
physical and socio-economic properties such as geographical country size, population 
size, flood hazard and flood risk, and GDP are presented and their relationships with 
insurance systems are discussed. 
 
Flood risks in Europe 
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Table 3 provides a list of estimates of absolute flood loss potentials (the product of 
hazard and exposure) in 11 European countries for which estimates are available from 
Swiss Re (1998a; 1998b). Note that these are not precise numbers, but rather 
indications of the order of magnitude of the largest direct economic losses that can be 
expected. Flash floods are estimated to lead to losses in the order of hundreds millions 
of Euros in most countries, with perhaps higher losses in Switzerland. River floods 
have the potential to cause billions of Euros in losses in most countries. Particularly 
vulnerable to river floods are Germany, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
Storm surges have the potential to inflict the largest damages, again in particular in 
Germany, The Netherlands and the UK. However, it is important to relate the absolute 
potential losses from floods to the local economy. These relative losses may be best 
measured by the potential losses as percent of national GDP, are listed in the fifth 
column of Table 3. According to this list, the Czech Republic, Poland and The 
Netherlands are particularly vulnerable, as they may experience losses of over 2% of 
their GDP. 
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Table 3. Flood loss potential estimates for 11 European countries, in absolute terms, 
in percent of gross domestic product (based on Swiss Re, 1998a; 1998b), and risk 
index R. 
Country Flood loss potential (106 Euros) Share of 
GDP 
Flood risk R 
(this research)1 
 Flash flood River flood Storm surge   
Belgium 100s 100s >1,000 <1% 14.0 109 
Czech Republic - 1,000s None >2% 23.6 109 
France 100s 1,000s - <1% 29.4 109 
Germany 100s 10,000s 10,000s 1-2% 10.6 109 
Italy 100s 10s - 1-2% 31.9 109 
Poland - 1,000s - >2% 15.1 109 
Portugal 100s 1,000s - 1-2% 8.3 109 
Spain - 1,000s 100s <1% 28.3 109 
Switzerland 1,000s 1,000s None 1-2% 35.2 109 
The Netherlands 100s 30,000-
60,000 
100,000 >2% 24.7 109 
United Kingdom - >1,000 10,000-
60,000 2 
1-2% 26.2 109 
Notes: - No information 
1
 See Equation 2 for explanation 
2
 Estimate for insured losses for storm surge on the east coast, storm surge barrier on 
the Thames remains intact 
 
 
Also listed in the last column in Table 3 is the flood risk index R, as calculated by 
using Equation 2. This index reflects the historic flood risk, rather than the potential 
flood risk as it contains the observed flood hazard over the period 1987-2002. In 
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particular Switzerland, Italy, France, Spain and the UK have experienced considerable 
impacts in the recent past, which is reflected in the index R. 
 
Overview of insurance and compensation systems in Europe 
 
Table 4 lists the different insurance and compensation systems in Europe. They are 
divided into the three categories of traditional insurance systems, insurance systems in 
which the government participates, and ex-post compensation by the government. 
These three types are listed in the third, fourth and fifth column of Table 4. One or 
more systems may be present in a country at the same time; closed circles indicate the 
main insurance system, open circles represent additional systems. The specific 
situation is specified for a number of countries in the footnotes. 
 
We used the following distinction to classify insurance and compensation systems: 
1. Traditional (private) insurance systems. Their main characteristics are that these 
systems are set up and managed by private companies, and that the cover is 
financed from premiums that are paid before the event (ex ante). Some of these 
systems may have support from the government, for instance through state-
guaranteed reinsurance. 
2. Insurance or pooling systems in which the government has a considerable role, 
through setting up and managing the pool. Cover is provided through ex ante 
premiums or ex ante taxes on insurance policies. 
3. Systems administered by the government, consisting of ex post compensation of 
flood losses. These systems are not considered to be insurance, as the basic 
property of ex ante premium or tax collection is not present. Rather, loss 
compensation is paid from tax money, either ad hoc or through budget 
reservations. 
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Table 4. Overview of flood insurance and compensation systems in 19 European countries. (Mainly based on Van Schoubroeck, 1997; Swiss Re, 
1998b; OECD, 2003; and CEA, 2005). Closed circles indicate the main insurance system, open circles represent additional systems. Type of 
contract can be O=optional, or B=bundled; an asterisk (*) denotes compulsory inclusion. 
Country Code Insurance/compensation system Contracts  Market penetration 
  Private Government Household Business/industry Household Business/industry 
  Ex ante 
premium 
Ex ante 
premium 
Ex post 
(compensation) 
    
Austria AT    O O 10-25% 
Belgium BE 1 2   O <10% 
Czech Republic CZ    O O 15% 10-30% 
Denmark DK  3  B* B* High 
Finland FI 4   O O 10-25% 
France FR 5   B* B* 100% 100% 
Germany DE   6 O O <10% 7 <10% 
Greece GR    B B <10% 
Hungary HU   8 B B 60% 9 
Italy IT    O O <5% 40-50% 
Norway NO 10   B* B* 75% 
Poland PL    O O 25% 25-50% 
Portugal PT    B B High High 
Slovakia SK    O O <10% 
Spain ES 11   B* B* Very high Very high 
Sweden SE    B B 75% 
Switzerland CH 12 13  B* B* 100% 100% 
The Netherlands NL 14  15 O 14 O Negligible 16 Low 
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United Kingdom UK    B B/O 95% 100% 
Notes:  
1
 A compulsory insurance system is in place since late 2005, the market penetration of which is yet to be determined. Listed penetration is from 
Swiss Re (1998). 
2
 Through the Calamity Fund established in 1990 
3
 Flood insurance pool through levy on fire contracts, with state guarantee 
4
 With state participation (CEA, 2005) 
5
 Through the Cat Nat scheme (private), with state guaranteed reinsurance through the Caisse Central de Réassurance (OECD, 2003) 
6
 After the 2002 Elbe floods, the German federal government provided substantial ad hoc relief for flood victims (Thieken et al. 2006) 
7
 Regionally, penetration can be much higher, such as in Baden-Württemberg (80%) and Saxony/Saxony-Anhalt (50%) (Thieken et al. 2006) 
8
 The central government provided relief after the 2001 Tisza flood, despite many insurance payments (see Vari et al., 2003) 
9
 In high-risk areas this percentage may be less, around 40% (see Vari et al., 2003) 
10
 Through the Norsk Naturskadepool, managed by the Norwegian Financial Services Association 
11
 Through the private/public corporation Consorcio de Compensación de Seguros 
12
 Contents and business interruption, and buildings in some cantons 
13
 In 19 of 26 cantons, state monopoly insurers cover buildings, with mutual intercantonal reinsurance association 
14
 Damage from heavy precipitation is covered by private insurance. Additionally, some foreign insurance companies provide cover for losses 
from river flooding and storm surges 
15
 Compensation of catastrophic losses by the Calamities Compensation Act (WTS) since 1998 
16
 It is estimated that most households have insurance against damage from heavy precipitation (RIZA, 2003) 
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Figure 1 gives an overview of the countries considered in this study and the type of 
insurance system. The commercial insurance system is subdivided in systems that 
have a market penetration of 50% or more, and countries that have an insurance 
penetration of less than 50%. In most European countries private flood insurance 
systems prevail (15 out of 19 countries). However, in these countries market 
penetration of insurance varies considerably as can be seen form the last column in 
Table 4. The number of countries where at least half the population has taken out 
flood insurance amounts to only seven. Also, in some countries the government has 
recently stepped in to compensate losses, regardless of the fact that commercial flood 
insurance was available, such as in Hungary and Germany (Vari et al., 2003; 
Schwarze and Wagner, 2004; Thieken et al., 2006). In another three countries 
(Belgium, Denmark and Switzerland), the government is playing an active role in 
setting and managing up ex ante mechanisms. In Belgium, a compulsory insurance 
system has been put in place since late 2005. In this analysis however, we treat 
Belgium according to the prior classification, as the market penetration and overall 
effects of this new system have yet to be determined. One country, The Netherlands 
has an ex post system for compensation of flood losses operated by the government, 
in which compensation is paid from tax money. This system was institutionalised in 
1998 by law, after an earthquake in 1992 and flooding in 1993 (Faure and Hartlief, 
2001). 
 
The sixth and seventh column in Table 4 show whether the flood insurance cover is 
sold as a bundled package (usually with fire insurance), or as optional cover in 
insurance contracts. The last two columns show the level of market penetration of the 
ex ante insurance systems (both private and government), that is the amount of 
policies that are sold relative to the number of potential sales. As bundled options are 
often compulsory on account of the regulator, bundled flood insurance typically has a 
higher market penetration level than optional insurance. All countries that have 
bundled insurance have a market penetration of 50% or more, except for Greece. As 
penetration may be regarded as the end result of the way insurance products are 
offered (either bundled or optional), it seems more relevant to classify the different 
insurance systems by market penetration level, rather than contract type. 
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Figure 1. Overview of national flood insurance and compensation systems in Europe 
considered in this study. 
 
 
Next, we relate a number of country specific properties to the different insurance 
systems and their penetration levels, which may explain why certain systems have 
been set up in different countries. 
 
Systems and flood hazard 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the flood hazard index, as calculated from 
observed flood events over the period 1987-2002 (Equation 1), and insurance type. 
There appears to be no clear relationship between flood occurrence and the type of 
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flood insurance system, although some countries that have a private insurance system 
have a substantially lower flood hazard (e.g. Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Greece). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Average national flood hazard index H and insurance systems in 19 
European countries. The line delineates the average per category. 
 
 
Systems and flood risk 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the flood risk per country as calculated by Equation 2. Note that 
flood risk R is not a measure for the actual potential losses in flood plains in Europe. 
Rather, it is a measure of risk, reflecting the total amount of GDP production in each 
NUTS3 area, multiplied by the local flood hazard index H, summed per country. This 
measure is relevant, as it shows that despite the flood hazard index H, countries may 
have more or less capital exposed in flood prone areas. 
 
It could be expected that in countries with a high flood risk, commercial insurance 
would be a less interesting option. But it seems that there is no decisive influence 
from flood risk on insurance type. This finding is similar as for the flood hazard (see 
Figure 2). Countries that have a high flood risk, and a commercial insurance system, 
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such as France, Spain and the UK, may be able to spread the flood risk due to their 
large geographical size (see below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Flood risk R and insurance systems in 19 European countries. 
 
 
Systems and country size 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the geographical size of the countries per country and per 
insurance type. The solid black lines show the average per country group. The private 
system is separated into two parts: the systems with a market penetration level up to 
50%, and systems with a higher market penetration level. It is clear that the countries 
with the largest surface area tend to have private insurance systems, with reasonable 
market penetration. This can be seen for instance in Sweden, Spain and France. 
Countries with a large geographical size have a lower probability of a high loss event 
affecting a large part of the country at the same time, which is the correlated risk of 
flood losses. At the same time, countries with a small country size, such as Denmark, 
Switzerland, Belgium, The Netherlands and Hungary, have no extensive commercial 
flood insurance cover. 
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Figure 4. Country surface area (1,000s km2) and insurance systems in 19 European 
countries. 
 
 
There seems to be a relationship (although not significant at 95% confidence) between 
the geographical size of the countries and the market penetration level of the different 
systems (r2=0.21, p=0.051) (Figure 5a). There are some countries that do not follow 
this trend; in particular Switzerland that has a high market penetration level despite a 
relatively small country size; and Germany that has a considerable country surface 
area, but a low market penetration level. 
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Figure 5. Correlations between market penetration level and country surface area (a) 
and average population density (b). For country codes see Table 4. 
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Systems and population size 
 
The pattern that was observed for insurance systems and geographical size can also be 
observed for population size (Figure 6). Large populations may be able to share flood 
risks more easily, and make private systems attractive for large countries, as it 
increases the possibility for diversification. This pattern however is less pronounced 
than country size (see above), as some countries with smaller population sizes do have 
a quite extensive commercial flood insurance cover, such as Norway, Sweden and 
Portugal. However, these countries, except for Hungary, also have a considerable 
smaller flood hazard (see Figure 2), which may explain why penetration is high in 
these relatively small countries. Another reason may be that offering flood insurance 
is more cost efficient in larger countries if the average costs of flood insurance 
decrease when insurance companies serve more clients. That is, if economies of scale 
of scale are present in flood insurance markets (Molyneux et al., 1996). This would 
decrease the cost per policy and could increase market penetration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Total population size (millions) and insurance systems in 19 European 
countries. 
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There is a significant relationship between average population density per country and 
market penetration level (r2=0.26, p=0.027) (Figure 5b). Countries that have high 
population densities, such as The Netherlands and Belgium (404 km-2 and 304 km-2, 
respectively), tend to have a high government involvement in insurance or 
compensation arrangements. 
 
Systems and gross domestic product 
 
It seems that the different insurance systems are applied irrespective of gross domestic 
product per capita (GDP) (Figure 7). However, countries that have a relatively low 
per capita GDP, such as Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Portugal and 
Greece tend to have commercial flood insurance systems. Countries that have opted 
for a system where the government has a central role, in particular Belgium, 
Denmark, Switzerland and The Netherlands, have a GDP above the average GDP of 
countries with a commercial flood insurance system. 
 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
Our analysis has shown that flood insurance systems in Europe can be classified 
according to a number of characteristics, in particular: 
• The role of the private sector and the government 
• The ex ante or ex post provision of premiums 
• The level of market penetration of the insurance system 
 
These characteristics were chosen, since the roles of the two sectors and the mode of 
provision of premiums indicate to what extent the private market or governments are 
exposed to flood losses, and to what extent they play a role in transferring price 
signals of flood risks. The level of market penetration reflects the extent to which the 
system has been adopted. Other characteristics may also be relevant for measuring the 
systems functioning, such as the differentiation of premiums, the height of the 
premiums, the height of the deductibles, and the height of the limits of indemnity. 
These latter characteristics are important in order to determine the exact cover of 
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households and business, and the exact exposure to losses of the private market and 
government sectors. But information on these characteristics is less accessible or 
comparable. 
 
From our analysis it is clear that, contrary to what many believe, the availability of 
flood insurance is widespread in Europe (see Figure 1, and Table 4), although systems 
may be quite different from country to country. Market penetration for instance is 
high (50% or more) in only 7 out of 19 countries included in our study. And in these 
countries, some form of solidarity exists in the sense that flat rate premiums are 
mandatory for all, regardless of actual flood risks (e.g. in France and Spain). It seems 
that country surface area and population size are the dominant factors for determining 
the type of system (see Figures 4 and 6). Market penetration depends on whether 
flood cover is sold as bundled (often mandatory) or separate cover, and also to some 
extent on the country surface area (Figure 5a) and the average population density 
(Figure 5b). The flood hazard over recent times (Figure 2), a crude estimate of flood 
risks (Figure 3), or GDP per capita (Figure 7) have little to no relation with the flood 
insurance systems. 
 
Governments in Europe have claimed a central role in flood insurance, in particular 
by setting up and regulating insurance systems. In a number of instances they also 
actively participate in flood insurance pools based on ex ante premiums, such as in 
Belgium, Denmark and Switzerland. An ex post system compensation system has 
been installed in The Netherlands. In this country flood risk management has focussed 
on the prevention of floods, which would lead to a reduction of losses and a reduction 
in the demand for insurance. But this policy may now slowly be changing (see Ten 
Brinke and Bannink, 2004). 
 
Ex post compensation of flood losses still exists, either institutionalised, such as in 
The Netherlands, or ad hoc as shown in a number of countries in a number of 
instances (see Table 4 for details). Although ad hoc relief is mostly targeted to public 
infrastructure, it is clear that in some countries where commercial insurance exists, 
governments may be inclined to compensate individual victims also. Ad hoc relief 
may reduce public interest for commercial insurance cover, and it would be 
interesting to investigate the effect of public compensation on private insurance 
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demand, for example in Germany and Hungary where widespread aid was given, 
despite the availability of private insurance. It has also been suggested that relief may 
remove an incentive to reduce risks (Schwarze and Wagner, 2004). 
 
From our analysis we draw a number of conclusions. 
1. Possibilities may exist in some European countries that have commercial flood 
insurance but low market penetration to increase the share of commercial flood 
insurance. In these countries the flood hazard flood is relatively modest and the 
countries have a reasonable geographical and a relatively large population, which 
all would enable risk spreading. This is supported by our observation that country 
surface area and population size seem to be the dominant factors for determining 
the type of flood insurance system. This seems logic, as large countries have a 
better chance of diversifying natural hazard risks across the country and within a 
larger population, which is for instance the case in Germany, Italy and Poland. 
2. It may be desirable to transfer risks towards the European or global insurance, 
reinsurance and capital markets, if countries face high flood risks that national 
governments are unwilling to take on. Increasing the share of commercial flood 
insurance can be preferable over systems in which the government has a major 
role, if commercial insurance premiums are better capable of transferring price 
signals of actual flood risks. Countries where the government has taken a central 
role in flood loss compensation, and that have a relatively low flood hazard and 
flood risk may be able to shift this risk to the private sector. This is the case for 
Denmark, for instance. 
3. Insurance markets are only willing to take up flood risks if loss prevention is 
increased and the risk of high loss accumulation is reduced. Therefore, an 
important role for the government remains for the assessment and communication 
of actual flood risks, and programmes for loss prevention. 
4. In some countries, the flood hazard and flood risks may be too high, relative to 
their geographical size and population size for the private sector to provide full 
cover (see Table 3, and Figures 2 and 3). This holds true for Belgium, Switzerland 
and The Netherlands. In these countries, governments will probably keep a central 
role in covering or managing cover for flood losses. However, constructions may 
be found in which an initial part of the risks is taken up by the private sector, and 
excess losses are covered by government budgets. In these instances, a 
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compulsory system would be needed, in order to overcome adverse selection, such 
as in France, and recently in Belgium, and a proposal for Germany (Schwarze and 
Wagner, 2004). Such improved loss sharing between public and private sectors 
would thus increase the commercial insurability of part of the risks. 
5. Currently, primary insurance is largely confined to companies operating in a 
single country, which is due to the fact that there are considerable differences 
between European countries in the regulation of insurance of natural catastrophes 
(CEA, 2005). The establishment of a single market could increase the possibilities 
for private insurance companies to take up risks simultaneously in different 
countries, would provide the opportunity to spread risks more widely and thereby 
contribute to adaptability. 
 
We conclude that increasing application of flood insurance in Europe, perhaps with 
some adjustments, may contribute to a higher adaptability to changes in exposure and 
flooding probabilities. We have presented a line of reasoning in this article, according 
to which countries with a high market penetration of insurance with ex ante premium 
provision would be better able to handle uncertain future risks associated with floods. 
This is because under such a scheme, both the costumers of insurance products and 
government are sensitised to reduce risks. We have provided a number of assumptions 
of how this would work (see Section 2). The main assumptions were that for risk 
reduction incentives, premiums or taxes would need to reflect actuarial risks, which 
could be best achieved through differentiated ex ante premiums. Private insurance 
companies are likely to be better positioned to develop insurance products. As flood 
risks may be too high in some of the smaller European countries, private insurance 
systems may be needed that are capable of transferring risks outside the region. 
 
If this theoretically inspired assumption are true, we can interpret the remarkably 
large differences between the various European countries as signs of varying degrees 
of adaptability to flood risks. Countries with a private insurance system with a high 
market penetration may have an advantage, such as the countries of France, Hungary, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden and UK. Whilst countries with an ex ante polling system 
operated by the government, or ex post compensation system would have a 
disadvantage, such as the countries of Belgium, Denmark, Switzerland and The 
Netherlands. 
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Increasing the scale at which private flood insurance systems in Europe operate would 
require three activities, in which national European governments would have the 
leading role: First, increasing the market penetration of private flood insurance will 
probably require mandatory inclusion of flood risks in insurance policies. Secondly, a 
harmonisation of European financial services regulation, so that primary insurers 
could take up risks in different countries, thereby diversifying and spreading flood 
risks. Further harmonisation of financial services regulation within the EU as 
proposed in a recent White Paper on Financial Services Policy 2005-20104 may 
contribute to the establishment of a single market for insurance. Thirdly, European 
flood risk management may need to take a next step. After the development of a 
Flood Water Directive for the European Union with requirements for flood risk 
assessment and risk reduction, suggestions could be made to develop a European-
wide insurance system to deal with residual flood losses. 
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